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1. Introduction 
The paper addresses the question of strategic drivers in the banking sector and proposes an 
innovative approach that aims to understand how and by which measures the different bank 
business models (BMs) contribute to profitable bank strategies in terms of market evaluation. 
The relevance of the topic is due to the impact of the crisis on banking business, bank 
profitability and riskiness. All these factors have determined new challenges facing banks and 
regulators.  
From the managerial point of view, the crisis has caused a deep revision of banks’ strategies 
and has enhanced their ability to change/adapt both their business mix and the market 
positioning in the different strategic areas they compete in. 
In the years after the outbreak of the crisis, three main drivers have spurred a significant change 
of banks’ strategic plans.  
Firstly a new adverse economic context characterized by the combination of slow economic 
growth with historically low levels of interest rates. Both phenomena depress the perspectives 
of traditional bank intermediation in so far as they reduce and make riskier the lending activity 
and, at the same time, squeeze the profit margins on loans-deposits circuit. 
Secondly, the re-regulation introduced in the wake of the crisis is determining strategic changes 
in business models to adapt balance–sheet structures to new regulatory requirements: liquidity, 
high-quality capital, more stable funding resources and bail-inable debt.   
A third driver concerns the structural configuration of the main banking systems which affects 
the banks’ ability to face the increasing technological innovation and its impact on products and 
distributive channels.   
This Darwinian economic context opens to question of which banks are in a better position to 
emerge and, at the same time, which banks are going to become the victims of the much more 
competitive arena.     
The business model analysis (BMA) has become the conceptual framework used by analysts 
and regulators in the attempt to individuate the main strategic bank behaviours and their 
implications in terms of competitiveness and future performance and stability.  
As far as banking regulation and supervision are concerned, the interest is testified by the strong 
focus on BMA embedded in the Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP); it has 
also become a key area of the supervisory activity by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
in the Thematic Review in 2015 and 2016. BMA in banking supervision aims to reveal a bank’s 
key vulnerabilities in the short run and the viability and sustainability of its strategic plans in 
the short and medium terms. The supervisory assessment not only regards the risks undertaken 
by each bank and therefore its vulnerability (idiosyncratic risk in a micro-prudential 
perspective) but also its contribution to systemic risk, in a macro-prudential perspective.  
For financial analysts and investors the business model is an important element in the evaluation 
of banks’ ability to create value. In a phase of high financial market volatility and relevant needs 
of equity capital, it is crucial to understand how the market assesses and evaluates a bank’s 
process of restructuring and its changes of strategies and business mix. As a result, the market 
evaluation of the viability and sustainability of each bank’s business model is an important 
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element in the management strategic choices that should be considered  also as an analytical 
tool of banking supervisors. 
A key issue in BMA is the identification of banks’ business model types: which variables and 
typical characteristics should be considered? Can these variables be clustered into relative 
homogeneous groups so as to develop a peer analysis aimed at identifying the relative strengths 
and weaknesses of different business models?  
In the last two decades, the business model has become a key managerial concept but still now 
there is not a widely accepted definition in the economic literature, mainly based on strategic 
management studies, and some limits and difficulties are evident when applied to the financial 
sector. Notwithstanding the plurality of definitions, there is consensus in believing that BM 
offers a useful holistic perspective for understanding not only what businesses do but also how 
they do it.  
In our work we consider business models as the result both of portfolio choices and of strategic 
abilities to exploit the market positioning in order to create value in the different business areas. 
The portfolio choices find evidence in the different mix of strategic business areas (SBAs) 
which reflect how the “first level long-run strategies” (like differentiation, growth, 
diversification, internationalization) are translated into organizational features of different 
combinations of product/customers/resources to create and capture value. The strategic abilities 
embrace the managerial choices that pursue revenue enhancement, cost efficiency, risk 
management in the different business areas as to capture value from the adopted business mix. 
The main research question of the paper concerns the way in which the market defines and 
evaluates different business models/business mix.  
Respect to the previous works, our paper represents one of the first attempt to directly assess 
the risk/return implications of strategic drivers and of different product mixes implemented by 
the most relevant European banks. In this paper, we prefer capital market data (price to equity 
book value) to accounting data, because equity prices are forward-looking and hence better 
identifiers of prospective performances and risks associated with different strategic choices, 
and also of intangible values. We use an income composition approach, rather than a balance 
sheet approach, with a finer classification of the commissions and fees: Banking Commissions 
- that measure the income from banking and lending related services – and Market Commissions 
- that measure the income from securities, asset management, insurance and other financial 
services. Moreover, we use other strategic variables concerning “efficiency and risk strategies” 
like operating efficiency and risk factors. 
These choices enable us to classify European banking groups on the values that the market 
attributes to the main components of income once we control for the effects on market value of 
other strategic variables. To our knowledge, this is one of the first study that identifies clusters 
on the basis of accounting variable adjusted for a market evaluation. 
Our sample (proprietary data set) is made up of consolidated accounting data, for the period 
2006-2105, of listed European banking groups with a total asset value greater than 50 billion 
US$ at 2015. The final dataset includes 432 bank-year observations corresponding to 45 bank 
holding companies (BHCs) belonging to 14 countries. We select 30 banks from 9 countries in 
the Euro area, accounting for around 70% of the EMU's total banking assets, plus 15 Non-EMU 
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banking groups. Italy and Spain account for the majority of banks in the sample, given the 
fragmentation of their banking system. 
The main result is that non-interest components are the main determinants of the difference 
between accounting and market valuation. Disentangling the components of net fees and 
commission income reveals that financial market associates a better risk-return trade-off to non-
banking fees and commissions, compared to the banking ones. Moreover, as expected, financial 
market negatively reacts to an increase in the level of operating expenses, of the cost of credit 
and of the degree of systemic risk. Our major empirical findings remain qualitatively unchanged 
even considering price to equity book value measured at different time interval. 
These results have then been used in order to define the weight of the different business mixes 
at market value; this exercise enables us to identify 3 business models, using cluster analysis 
methodology. The different clusters do not show significant differences in terms of performance 
measure, with two principal exceptions. On one hand, risk return profile is higher for “Market 
oriented banks” while the probability of default, proxied by the Zscore, is higher for “Retail 
banks” group which encloses banks more linked to traditional banking business. The second 
cluster, “Retail diversified”, stands between the other two groups. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on 
Banking Business Model (BBM) by drawing on the main concepts adopted in the strategic 
management literature. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology and the data used. 
Section 4 describes the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Evolving market conditions, technological innovations, regulatory changes, and current 
monetary policy stance challenge the sustainability of banks’ business models. The business 
model question is increasingly grabbing the attention of bank managers, regulators, investors 
and financial analysts. The need to use the business model concept as a tool for analyzing the 
bank’s performance and assessing its viability asks, first of all, for a clear understanding of 
what business model means, since the existing literature does not offer a uniform picture (Klang 
et al., 2014). 
We start by drawing on the strategic management studies to deepen and specify the concepts of 
corporate strategy, business strategy and business model (Zott et al., 2011). 
In the strategic management studies, strategy, recognised as the foundation of competitive 
advantage and value creation (Porter, 1996), involves two levels of execution: corporate (what) 
and business (how). Corporate strategy (Ansoff, 1965) delineates the amplitude and 
diversification of the company’s business portfolio in terms of Strategic Business Areas 
(SBAs); it is the set of high-order (first level) long-run choices such as growth, size, governance 
structures, diversification, internationalization. It answers the question as to where we have to 
compete. Business strategy (second level) identifies how to achieve the competitive advantage 
in each SBA.  
A systemic perspective positions the BM closely to the strategy. It can be defined as the 
concrete choices that derive from actual combination of corporate/business strategies (Mottura, 
2011) and from the several involved activities and economic levers (price variables, control of 
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costs, customer segments, quality, distribution channels, relationship degree, technology, 
productive processes, etc.).  
This approach provides the rationale for connecting the key company strategic choices to their 
main consequences. BM is the representation of a subset of key realized choices and of their 
main consequences, put in relationship by the theory. Choosing a particular BM (policies, assets 
and governance) means choosing a particular way to operate, to create and to capture value for 
the firm’s stakeholders. Strategic choices set up the business model. Therefore, business model 
is not the strategy but is the direct result of a firm’s realized strategy (Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ricart 2010). 
This theoretical framework guides our review of the Banking Business Model (BBM) literature. 
In banking, corporate strategy (what) leads to SBAs choices reflected in the business mix (asset 
& liability composition and income composition), while business strategy (how) relates to the 
management of revenues, efficiency, and risk in each SBA. Business mix and business strategy 
are the components of the BM and the factors affecting performance indicators (profitability, 
risk levels, market value). 
Both long-run and business strategies are affected by the macroeconomic, competitive and 
regulatory variables. These context variables have ex ante effects on bank strategies and their 
BM in so far as they condition the hypothesis the strategic plans are based on. Ex post they 
directly affect the way in which the business strategies reach the targeted results. 
In Figure 1 we show the different strategic levels through which we represent the Business 
Model concept. This scheme allows us to classify the main contributions to BBM literature 
underlining how the different approaches focus on a different identification of strategic 
variables. 
 
Fig. 1 Bank Business models’ strategic components 
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A first classification of the literature concerns the different emphasis set on the identification 
of bank peer groups characterized by similar business models. Several studies follow the 
strategic group literature and aim at finding evidence of how banking industry can be classified 
into few different bank BMs that display different performance with respect to economic and 
financial context. This approach is based on a distinction of what the bank is doing (proxied by 
asset/liabilities and/or income composition), from how the bank is doing it (revenue 
enhancement, efficiency and risk management strategies), so that the BM concept overlaps with 
the business mix, whereas other strategic variables (revenues, efficiency, and risk strategies) 
are implicitly regarded and evaluated as outcomes of portfolio choices. This BM definition can 
lead to attribute to the business mix the performance results and obscure the role played by the 
ability of the bank in managing the single business area. 
This approach can be traced down in Ayadi and de Groen (2015) and Ayadi et al. (2016) 
contributions. Following the pioneering work of Passmore (1985) and Amel and Rhoades 
(1988) these authors employ a two stage procedure for the BM analysis of European banks. The 
first step adopts the cluster analysis to identify the bank groups on the base of asset and liability 
composition. Then, they evaluate how the bank clusters perform with respect to a very broad 
set of indicators concerning both performance results and strategic behaviours like risk 
exposure, loan growth, internationalization. Roengpitya et al. (2014) use the cluster algorithm, 
along with the adoption of some judgmental criteria and balance sheet ratios to classify the BMs 
of a large sample of listed and non-listed banks from 34 countries.  
De Meo et al. (2016) adopt an original fuzzy clustering technique based on a broad set of 
asset/liability mix indicators of listed and non-listed European banks (77 for 15 countries) for 
the period 2006-14. They individuate three main clusters of banks: Retail, Diversified, 
Investment banks. Then each group has been split according to four EBA classification criteria 
(systemic relevance, dimension, organizational complexity, cross border activity) considered 
by the authors as attributes of strategic choices.  
The specificity of bank strategies is the focus of Mergaert and Vennet (2016) analysis. They 
define the BM in terms of the strategic variables that reflect the long-term choices of 
management (latent strategies) related to assets and liabilities composition, capitalization, 
income structure and bank’s risk profile. The common variance of these variables are the factors 
that define two broad BBMs: retail and diversified. The authors underline the graduation of 
these models and use the common factor analysis to evaluate both how these long-run strategies 
are implemented and their impact on performance.  
A different approach to the grouping of European bank is employed by Bonaccorsi et al. (2016). 
They classify 112 significant European banks following a step procedure based on a priori 
threshold values of balance sheet parameters like size, lending propensity, international credit 
exposure.  
A second stream of the BM literature in banking relies on a wide definition of BM that combines 
corporate and business strategies with context variables. According to our scheme this approach 
has the merit of considering many strategic aspects of a BM even if these studies often fail to 
make a clear distinction between long-run strategies, business mix and business strategies. The 
primary aim of this approach is the identification of which BM variables affect the banks 
vulnerability, reflecting the supervisors’ concerns for the consequences of bank strategies on 
default events. This approach characterizes the work of Altunbas et al. (2011) who use a broad 
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set of bank characteristics to individuate BMs. Three risk measures of a large sample of 
European and US banks are regressed on some groups of indicators, collected in the pre-crisis 
period that should denote different banks’ BMs: asset, funding and income structure variables 
along with indicators like loan growth, capital ratio, total asset and a number of variables that 
account for major macroeconomic and institutional factors. Therefore their definition of BM 
includes business mix variables along with some other strategic variables concerning growth, 
capitalization and size. Köhler (2014) follows a similar approach relating the Z-logscore to 
some business mix and loan growth variables for a large sample of European banks. In Köhler 
(2015) the same risk indicator is regressed on two main business mix variables (non-interest 
income share and non-deposit funding as a fraction of total asset) and then integrated with many 
other control variables. The approach is similar to that adopted by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2010) for an international sample of 1,334 banks in 101 countries leading up to the 2008 
financial crisis.  
2.1. Novelty of our contribution  
With respect to the current BM literature our paper presents some significant differences. 
Firstly, we estimate the performance of different banks’ BMs in terms of market value instead 
of using accounting performance data. Following Baele et al. (2007) and Calomiris and Nissim 
(2014), we believe that equity prices are forward-looking and hence better identifiers of 
prospective profitability and risks of the different strategic choices. By taking into account the 
banks’ intangible assets, associated to relationship banking and bank’s reputation, the market 
analysts evaluate the qualitative information and the strategic drivers of specific bank 
performance (Chen et al., 2014). 
Secondly, the estimation of the effect of BMs on banks’ Price to book values is based on a 
definition of BM which includes the business mix variables (proxied by income components) 
and other strategic variables concerning “efficiency and risk strategies” like operating 
efficiency, risk behaviour (Beta and loan loss provisions). By keeping separated the business 
mix variables from the other ones, we estimate how the market evaluates the different business 
components and, as a second step, we use the estimated market value of these business 
components to individuate cluster of banks. The novelty of our approach is the classification of 
bank groups based on the values that the market attributes to the main components of income 
once we take into account the effects on market value of other strategic variables. To our 
knowledge, this is one of the first study that identify clusters on the basis of accounting variables 
adjusted for market value. 
As already outlined, in our study the business mix is proxied by the income composition. We 
prefer the income approach to the balance sheet composition as the former captures in a finer 
way the important bank service activity. By focusing on a sample of large banks we are able to 
propose a finer classification of the net fees and commissions income. We distinguish the 
Banking Commissions, that measure the income from banking and lending related services, 
from the Market Commissions that measure the income from asset management, insurance and 
other financial services. We are aware that income variables reflect product/customer 
combinations but also incorporate the bank pricing policies. According to our scheme these 
policies should belong to the strategic variables that explain how the bank is effective and 
efficient in delivering products and values to customers. By taking into account the high level 
of price competition in the banking markets and the precious informative content of income 
variables (whose values reflect the different types of products and segment of customers) we 
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believe that the last ones are more suited to capture the contribution of business mix to the bank 
value. 
3. Methodology and data 
3.1. Data  
The bank sample is made up of 45 banking groups belonging to fourteen European countries. 
The composition of the sample by country is provided in the appendix [Table A.1]. We have 
only considered consolidated data of listed European banking groups with a total asset value 
greater than 50 billion US$ at 2015.  
Bank-level data come from the annual balance sheet. We exclude banks with missing data on 
basic accounting variables, including assets, loans, deposits, equity, interest income, non-
interest income and commissions. We use the last ten years of data, 2006–2015. The starting 
date is 2006 because that is the first year when the different countries report accounting data 
based on IAS/IFRS. Stock price data are collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The final dataset includes 432 bank-year observations corresponding, in the last year 2015 to 
45 bank holding companies (BHCs) belonging to 14 countries. We select 30 banks from 9 
countries in the Euro area, accounting for around 70% of the EMU's total banking assets1, plus 
15 Non-EMU banking groups. Italy and Spain account for the majority of banks in the sample, 
given the fragmentation of their banking system. 
Differently from other studies (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Chiorazzo et al., 2008) we analyze 
the bank BM using consolidated accounting data. This latter choice is of particular importance 
for several reasons: on the one hand banks tend to reserve the making of non traditional 
innovative activities to non-banking subsidiaries whose contribution can be more precisely 
evaluated if consolidated financial statements are available; moreover, financial holding 
company represents the relevant unit of observation for regulators on extremly important topic 
such as the level of systemic risk (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). 
3.2. Measure of banks’ business mix  
To determine the results of choices concerning bank business mix, asset-based measure and/or 
income-based indicator can be used. Ideally to measure the array of bank activities, detailed 
data on the degree to which each bank underwrites, operates mutual funds, insurance, etc. 
should be used. The available dataset do not provide information with this type of detailed 
information on the different type of activities engaged. So several authors construct revenue 
based measure that suffers some measurement problems (Laeven and Levine 2007). In fact, 
loans and in general more traditional activities can yield fee income; in this way the income-
based measures that do not disentagle the different fee and commission components could 
overestimate the degree to which some lending institutions engage in non-lending activities. 
For instance, DeYoung and Rice (2004) show that payment services linked to traditional 
banking activities are the largest source of non-interest income for U.S. banks. Brighi and 
Venturelli (2014, 2016) find similar results for Italian BHCs. 
                                                          
1 2014 figures. 
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In line with our research question, we construct several business mix measures detailed in the 
remainder of the section.  
The first type of business mix analysed is the one related to the diversification across different 
sources of income. Traditionally in literature (Stiroh, 2004, 2006a, 2006b; Lepetit et al., 2008) 
one way to capture the degree of diversification of bank activities is to consider the net interest 
income generated by traditional activities and non-interest income produced by non-traditional 
ones. To account for diversification between major activities, we consider on the one hand the 
ratio between net interest margin over equity book value (INT) and on the other the ratio 
between net commission and trading income over equity book value (NON). 
The second set of indicators relate to the diversification between different sources of non 
interest income. Following the seminal work of DeYoung and Roland (2001), Stiroh (2004), 
Mercieca et al. (2007) and Lepetit et al. (2008) to allow for deeper insights, we have first of all 
to distinguish the principal components of non-interest income. Two main components have 
been identified: net fees and commission (COMM) on the one hand and the net results from 
trading activities (TRAD) on the other. 
The third step is to verify the degree of diversification within the commission revenues. To 
mitigate the overestimation problem we disaggregate fee income in relation to the type of 
activities developed. In particular, we divide net fees and commission revenue along two 
principal dimensions: 
- Banking Commissions (BANK), that comprise commission income from guaranties 
given, lending related, collection and payment services, services related to factoring, 
tax collection services, current accounts management and other services;  
- Market Commissions (MKT), fee and commission revenue from credit derivatives, 
trading operations in financial instruments and foreign exchange, custody and 
administration of securities, underwriting operations, servicing related to 
securitization, placement of securities, financial structure consultancy service, fees 
from portfolio management services, depositary bank services, investment 
consultancy service and from the distribution of third party products and services; 
To our purpose, the variable total net fees and commission income (COMM) is the sum of 
Banking and Market commission. This disaggregation enable us to identify a more precise 
measure of the traditional banking business. To this end, banking commission have been first 
of all added to net interest margin in order to define the variable ADJ_INT = INT + BANK. 
All variables are computed as the fraction over the equity book value and trimmed at the 1% 
level. 
3.3. Market based and accountancy performance measures  
Market based performance is measured in terms of Price to book value (PBV). This indicator 
is used in the first part of the analysis when we evaluate how the market values the business 
mix and the other strategic variables.  
Several alternative proxies of bank accountancy performance are employed when we compare 
the performance of the bank clusters: the return on average equity (ROAE) defined as the ratio 
of net profits to total average equity, the return on average assets (ROAA) defined as the ratio 
of net profits to total average assets. To adjust this last measure for risk (volatility), following 
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Stiroh (2004) and Chiorazzo et al. (2008) we compute the ratio between the annual ROA and 
its standard deviation calculated over the entire sample period. SHROAi,t indicates risk-adjusted 
returns, for the bank i in the year t. Analytically: 
i
ti,
ti,
σROA
ROA
SHROA   
Finally as in Stiroh (2004) we introduce a proxy for insolvency risk computed in terms of the 
Z-score. The Z-Score measures by how many standard deviations a firm is away from 
insolvency. A higher Z-Score indicates improved risk-adjusted performance; in other words, 
higher values of Z-score imply lower probabilities of failure. Analytically: 
i
ti,
ti,
ti,
ti,
σROA
TA
E
ROA
score-Z









  
where E/TA is the equity-to-total asset ratio (equity capital divided by total assets). 
3.4. Efficency,risk and other variables 
To proxy bank’s credit quality we use the ratio Loan loss provision over equity book value 
(LLP).  
To measure the effect of efficiency on bank profitability (COST) we introduce in the analysis 
the ratio of operating expenses over book value. The variable operating expenses is computed 
as the sum between personnel expenses and other administrative expenses.  
As a proxy for bank risk and leverage we use the variable Beta (BETA). The BETA of each 
bank is obtained by estimating, with the OLS method, the market model. More precisely, the 
BETA of bank j for the year t is estimated using daily returns in local currency of the bank j in 
year t. The returns of the market portfolio are those of the S & P 100 E GLOBAL - PRICE 
INDEX in Euros.  
Processing the R2 of these regressions, we also build another variable named 
INTERNATIONALIZATION. In detail, the INTERNATIONALIZATION index of bank j in 
year t is the difference between the R2 of the market model of the bank j in year t and the average 
R2 in year t computed for the entire sample of banks in the year. Higher values signal higher 
degree internationalization. Also this variable is employed when we compare the performance 
of the bank clusters. 
To catch the effect of the financial and sovereign debt crisis two structural break dummies are 
introduced. To account for the consequences from financial crisis we insert a dummy variable 
CRISIS_FIN equals to one for the years 2008 and 2009 and equals to zero otherwise; to account 
for the consequences from government debt crisis we insert a dummy variable CRISIS_GOV 
equals to one for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 and equals to zero. otherwise.  
To control for the country effect, two country dummy variables are included in the analysis: 
EURO_CORE equals to one for France, Germany, Ireland, Belgium and Austria and equals to 
zero otherwise; EURO_NON_CORE equals to one for Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
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3.5. Empirical methodology 
The approach is based on the panel data random effect model2 between the market-to-book ratio 
(our dependent variable) and proxies for bank activities, which are based on measures derived 
from accounting variables. We are able to capture how a greater focus on the traditional 
business, captured by net interest income, for instance, affects the bank’s market value. 
We use the econometric models shown to examine the link between market performance and 
the business mix. In particular: 
ti,
5
3s
ti,sti,2ti,1ti,ti, ελβNONβINTβαy  

       (1) 
i,t
6
4s
i,tsi,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t ελβTRADβCOMMβINTβαy  

      (2) 
i,t
7
5s
i,tsi,t4i,t3i,t2i,t1i,ti,t ελβTRADβMKTβBANKβINTβαy  

     (3) 
ti,
6
4s
ti,sti,3ti,2ti,1ti,ti, ελβTRADβMKTβADJ_INTβαy  

      (4) 
ti,
8
7s
ts
6
4s
ti,sti,3ti,2ti,1ti,ti, εcrisisβλβTRADβMKTβADJ_INTβαy  

    (5) 
ti,
10
9s
is
8
7s
ts
6
4s
ti,sti,3ti,2ti,1ti,ti, εcountryβcrisisβλβTRADβMKTβADJ_INTβαy  

  (6) 
 
 
where i identifies the individual bank-observation belonging to the sample (i = 1, 2, 3,...,45); t 
expresses the time variable (t = 2006,…, 2015); s are the parameters to be estimated,  is a 
matrix of efficiency and risk variables. Both the constant and the error terms are also indicated 
in the model. 
INT is the ratio between net interest income over equity book value, NON is the ratio between 
non traditional revenues (BANK, MKT, TRAD) over equity book value, COMM is the ratio 
between net commission income computed as the sum of banking (BANK) and market (MKT) 
commission – over equity book value. TRAD is the ratio of trading profit, BANK is the ratio 
of banking commission, MKT is the ratio of market commission and finally ADJ_INT is the 
ratio of net interest margin adjusted for banking commission (INT+BANK), all variables 
computed as the fraction over the equity book value.  
The other variables control for factors, related to the efficiency and risk sphere, potentially 
affecting the market valuation.  
                                                          
2 We tested for our final regression specifications whether FE or RE was to be preferred (using both the Hausman 
specification test and the Breusch Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test). The result show that the individual effects 
(μi) were in most cases not significantly correlated with the explanatory variables, so that random effects was 
the best way to model bank level specificities. De Haas and Van Lelyveld. (2006) and Fries et al. (2002) conclude 
the same.  
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Results of Model 6 have been then used in order to define the weight of the different business 
mixes at market value. The variables that describe the banks’ business mix are ADJ_INT, MKT, 
TRAD. For each of the three variables, we first compute for each bank the average over the 
time span; then we multiply the average for the coefficient of the panel model. Then, for each 
bank in the sample, we express the weight on base 100 in order to define an income composition 
at market value. 
Once defined the weight of the different lines of income at market value, we use them in order 
to identify business models, using cluster analysis methodology. As in Ayadi and de Groen 
(2016), we use Ward’s cluster analysis technique (Ward, 1963) which is an agglomerative 
hierarchical clustering method that forms clusters on the basis of minimising within group 
variance3. In fact, this approach forms data into clusters around a centroid, or mean. The 
distance between the actual observations and this centroid is the within-group variation of the 
cluster. Ward's method seeks to minimize the ratio of within-group variation to between-group 
variation, that is, the squared Euclidean distances between the centroids of the various clusters. 
The procedure form partitions in a hierarchical manner starting form the largest number of 
clusters possible and merging clusters by minimizing the within-cluster sum-of-squared-errors 
for any given number of clusters.  
Moreover, to diagnose the appropriate number of clusters, Calinski and Harabasz’s (1974) 
pseudo F-index, was used. This stopping rule is a sample estimate of the ratio of between-
cluster variance to within-cluster variance. The configuration with the greatest pseudo-F value 
was chosen as the most distinct clustering. 
A list of the variable used is presented in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 around here] 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the sample of European BHCs. These banks are 
quite varied with mean average assets of € 557 billion that range from € 22 billion to € 2,590 
billion. UK and French banks are the largest, with an average total assets of billion € 1,320 and 
1,070 respectively. Our sample includes both low and high performing BHCs both in terms of 
market and accounting measures; the mean PBV is 1.06 and the median is 0.86. The mean 
ROAA is 0.35%, with a median of 0.39%.  
As for business mix measures are concerned, the average (mean) bank generated 63.9% of its 
revenues from net interest income, 27.2% from net fees and commission income and 8.4% from 
trading profit. The composition of net fees and commission income shows a nearly equal 
contributions of BANK (47.7%) and MKT (52.2%) commissions; this result testifies to the 
relevance of fees and commissions linked to traditional banking business. Therefore banking 
                                                          
3 For a discussion of the various methods of cluster analysis, see Lehmann et al. (1998). 
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commissions, when added to net interest income, represent on average the 76.9% of the total 
operating income. 
 
[Table 2 around here] 
 
4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
The hypothesised existence of a positive relationship between market performance and different 
business mixes, aims to understand how and by which measures the bank business mixes 
contribute to profitable bank strategies in terms of market valuation proxied by price to equity 
book value (Table 3). 
The main result is that especially non-interest components foster market valuation (column 1). 
When we control for the different components of non-interest income a clearer picture emerges. 
Trading profit (columns 2-6) and market commissions (columns 3-6) have a statistically 
significant effect and the latter impact more on price to equity book value than banking ones 
(column 3). 
The disaggregation of the net fees and commission income introduced in the present 
contribution seems to represent a critical step in the understanding of how the financial market 
evaluates the different banks’ business mix. Our results suggest that financial market seems to 
associate to market fees and commissions, compared to the banking ones a higher value creation 
(i.e.: better risk-return trade-off). 
Turning to the variables more linked to efficiency and risk factors, all of them produce results 
consistent with our expectations. The market negatively reacts to an increase in the level of 
operating expenses, of the cost of credit and of the degree of systemic risk (Table 3, columns 
1-6). These results enable also to appreciate the choice of market value as dependent variable. 
In fact, Price-to-equity-book value captures directly both forward-looking market expectations 
and return and risk features of the different strategies as testified by the significance of the risk 
factors (Beta and LLP). Differently from the more consolidated literature that puts into relation 
business model characteristics and risk, introducing risk as a dependent variable (see Altunbas 
et al. 2011; Bonaccorsi et al. 2016), the choice to use market value enable us to explicit and 
directly count for the risk dimension. 
The negative and statistical significant sign for the dummy break variables suggests that both 
crisis, as expected, unequivocally negatively impact bank market value and that sovereign debt 
crisis hits more than financial one, Turning to the country effect, the negative sign of the two 
country dummy variables signal that banks belonging to the euro area have testified a stronger 
reduction in market value than banks located outside euro area (United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Denmark and Poland). 
 
[Table 3 around here] 
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Results of Model 6 have been then used in order to define the weight of the different business 
mixes at market value. Once defined the weight of the different lines of income, we use them 
in order to identify business models, using cluster analysis methodology.  
Applying Calinski and Harabasz’s (1974) pseudo F-index (Table 4), we identify 3 clusters.  
 
[Table 4 around here] 
 
Cluster characteristics can be easily summarised with a radar plot (Figure 1). Cluster 3, made 
up of 8 banks4, includes banks “Market oriented” with the highest incidence of market 
commissions and trading profits and the lowest rate of adjust net interest income; these are 
banks for which a considerable proportion of the income is raised from non-traditional activities 
that represent the largest share of profits. Cluster 1, made up of 16 banks5, includes banks with 
the highest incidence of net interest income and banking commissions and the lowest share of 
market commission (Retail banks). The second cluster stands between the other two groups. It 
is composed by 21 banks6 “Retail diversified” that show a higher incidence of market 
commissions than cluster 1 but lower than cluster 3, and a lower ratio of net interest income 
and banking commission than cluster 1 but higher than cluster 3. In Table 5 we summarize the 
principal characteristics of the groups identified.  
 
[Table 5 around here] 
 
Cluster 3 is characterised by the highest ratio of operating costs on equity book value, confirmed 
also by the highest cost to income ratio, and by the lowest cost of credit risk. These are banks 
characterised also by the highest degree of internazionalisation. 
The different clusters do not show significant differences in terms of performance measure, 
with two principal exceptions. On the one hand, the risk-adjusted performance measure is 
higher for Cluster 3 as testified by the highest SHROAA while, on the other hand, the 
probability of default, proxied by the Zscore, is higher for Cluster 1 which encloses banks more 
linked to traditional banking business.  
From the perspective of the efficiency and risk strategies (our second level of BM definition, 
that is the managerial choices that pursue revenue enhancement, cost efficiency, risk 
                                                          
4 Crédit Industriel et Commercial SA – CIC; Credit Suisse Group AG; Deutsche Bank AG; Julius Baer Group Ltd; 
Natixis SA; Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB; Société Générale SA; UBS Group AG 
5 Aareal Bank AG; Allied Irish Banks plc; Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna; Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
SA; Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp; Banco de Sabadell SA; Banco Popular Espanol SA; Barclays 
Plc; Caixabank, S.A.; Danske Bank A/S; Deutsche Postbank AG; Erste Group Bank AG; Lloyds Banking Group Plc; 
Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA - PKO BP SA; Raiffeisen Bank International AG; Royal Bank of 
Scotland Group Plc (The) 
6 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena; Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL; Banco 
Popolare - Società Cooperativa-Banco Popolare; Banco Santander SA; Bankia; Bankinter SA; BNP Paribas; 
Commerzbank AG; Crédit Agricole S.A.;HSBC Holdings Plc; ING Groep NV; Intesa Sanpaolo; Jyske Bank A/S 
(Group); KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA-KBC Group; Mediobanca SpA-MEDIOBANCA - Banca di Credito 
Finanziario Società per Azioni; Nordea Bank AB (publ); Standard Chartered Plc; Svenska Handelsbanken; 
Swedbank AB; UniCredit SpA; Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI Banca 
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management in the different business areas to capture value from the adopted business mix), 
the clustering based on the business mix reveals differences in all our measures of efficiency 
and risk (operating costs, internationalization, credit risk), except beta. This means that the 
bank’s systematic risk, and consequently its cost of equity capital, does not depend on the 
business mix only. Therefore, the way in which the business mix is managed seems to be 
relevant especially for the non-diversifiable risk profile of the bank.  
4.3. Robustness checks 
In this section, we investigate the likely impact of different measures of bank market 
performance.  
At this purpose, we re-run our baseline Model (Model 6) changing the definition of PBV 
employed. We use PBV measured at subsequent periods of time (Table 6). In column 1, we use 
year-end PBV for year t as in Table 3; in the subsequent columns (2-6) we use PBV computed 
respectively at the end of January, at the end of February, at the end of March, at the end of 
April and at the end of May of year t+1. The adjustment aims to control for the date at which 
the accounting data enter into the market information set. In this sense, the end of the year stock 
prices may not fully reflect the value implications of annual report information. While generally 
financial statements are approved by the shareholders meetings between the months of April 
and May; it is also true that the boards of directors approve the financial statement proposals in 
previous months, between February and March, and simultaneously they disclose key data. 
Even before this disclosure, the investors deal with analysts' estimates centered on up to date 
information. So it is quite possible that on the one hand at the end of the year t, the market 
capitalization already reflects the year t accounting information as, on the other, that the value 
implications of annual report information on stock prices follow a slower process. Following 
Calomiris and Nissim (2014), to control for this potential bias and avoid the distorting effects 
of any capital increases or other extraordinary operations, the market cap of the months from 
January to May of the year t+1 is computed multiplying the end-of-year market value by one 
plus the cumulative stock return till the reference date. 
 
[Table 6 around here] 
 
As can be seen in Table 6 also considering PBV measured at different time interval, our major 
empirical findings remain qualitatively unchanged with the exception of Beta that loses its 
statistical significance. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper empirically investigates the way in which the financial market defines and evaluates 
different business models/business mix, using a sample of 45 relevant listed European banking 
groups, in the period 2006-2015.  
We define business models as the result both of portfolio choices and of strategic abilities to 
exploit the market positioning in order to create value in the different business areas. The 
portfolio choices find evidence in the different mix of strategic business areas (SBAs) and are 
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proxied by the different business mix composition or the different income components. 
Strategic abilities embrace the managerial choices that pursue revenue enhancement, cost 
efficiency, risk management in the different business areas as to capture value from the adopted 
business mix and are proxied by efficiency and risk factors included in the empirical 
specification. 
These choices enable us to classify European banking groups based on the values that the 
market attributes to the main components of income once we control for the effects on market 
value of other strategic variables. 
The main results suggest that non interest components foster market valuation and that financial 
market seems to associate to non banking fees and commissions, compared to the banking ones 
(i.e.: better risk-return trade-off). Moreover, as expected, financial market negatively reacts to 
an increase in the level of operating expenses, of the cost of credit and of the degree of systemic 
risk. Our major empirical findings remain qualitatively unchanged even considering price to 
equity book value measured at different time interval.  
This evidence enable us to identify 3 cluster of European banking groups based on the values 
that the market attributes to the main components of income. The different clusters do not show 
significant differences in terms of performance measure, with two principal exceptions: risk 
return profile is higher for “Market oriented banks” while the probability of default, proxied by 
the Z-score, is higher for “Retail banks” group which encloses banks more linked to traditional 
banking business. The second cluster, “Retail diversified”, stands between the other two groups. 
These findings solicit some interesting considerations also in terms of policy implications.  
First of all, our study contributes to define the concept of BM and stresses that BM includes not 
only strategic variables related to the asset mix composition but also efficiency and risk 
variables that most contribute to shareholders’ and customers’ value. Given this, it is necessary 
to deepen and to analyze the nexus between these variables to understand the strategic decisions 
interdependencies and their connection with banks performance. 
Our analysis suggest that financial market seems to associate a better risk-return trade-off to 
market-oriented banks. This result is not only linked to the more intense trading activities 
developed by these banks but to the wide and articulated range of services related to custody 
and administration of securities, to underwriting operations, to portfolio management and 
advisory service. Although it is a bunch of activities with a high incidence of operating costs, 
it allows to achieve a level of revenues that is reflected in a higher market value. The 
conclusions of our work on this topic are not in line with the prevalent literature on bank 
diversification that indicates that the higher revenues linked to security activities are more than 
offset by the higher level of risk associated to this market activity (Mercieca et al. 2007, Lepetit 
et al. 2008, Baele et al. 2007, Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). 
From the point of view of the banking supervision, business model analysis (BMA) embedded 
in the SREP should take into consideration capital market data since equity prices are forward-
looking and hence better identifiers of prospective performance and risks associated with 
different strategic choices. Our study shows how the different variables that affect BM are 
associated to different market values. Since SREP exercise is developed also in order to 
evaluate the bank capital adequacy, the point of view of the market should not be ignored. 
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The last consideration is associated to the theme of information disclosure. As underlined 
before, from the shareholder point of view, the banking business model is an important element 
in the evaluation of banks’ ability to create value. This valuation is strictly connected to the 
type, amount and quality of information disclosed.  
In the most consolidated literature on bank diversification, one way to capture the degree of 
diversification of bank activities is to consider net interest income generated by traditional 
activities and non-interest income produced by non-traditional ones in aggregate term or at best, 
distinguishing the two principal components of non-interest income: commission and fee 
revenue on the one hand and the net results of financial operations on the other. The aggregate 
analysis of the net fee and commission income does not allow for their allocation to the various 
areas of banking activity. In the recent literature on banks’ BM a classification of business 
activities based on the composition of the balance sheet assets and liabilities prevails in order 
to overcome the limitations associated to aggregate income measures.  
We overcome the limitations associated to aggregate income measures by identifying those 
banks that provide detailed data on fees and commission income. In fact, our study deals with 
the main European banks for several reasons: because of their systemic importance, for their 
greater articulation by business segments and last but not least for the deeper and more detailed 
disclosure of balance sheet information provided. This type of informational disclosure enable 
us to disaggregate fee income in relation to the type of activity developed. Based on this 
breakdown, our study allows to distinguish the market value created from services more linked 
to traditional banking business from those associated to financial markets.  
To conclude, our contribution also shows the importance of disclosure and the need to 
harmonize, among the different European countries, the reported breakdown of the different 
sources of income. A finer classification of the net fees and commission components is essential 
since they stem from activities materially different one from the other and given their growing 
role in the formation of operating income and in conditioning bank performance. 
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Table 1  Variables names and definitions  
Name Definition 
PBV Market price to equity book value 
INT Net interest income over equity book value 
ADJ_INT 
Net interest income over equity book value + Banking commission over 
equity book value  
COMM 
Banking commission over equity book value + Market commission over 
equity book value 
BANK Banking commission over equity book value 
MKT Market commission over equity book value 
TRAD Trading profit over equity book value 
NON Non-interest income [COMM+TRAD] over equity book value   
TOP Total operating income [INT+COMM+TRAD] over equity book value   
COST 
Total operating expenses [Personnel and other administrative expenses] 
over equity book value 
LLP Loan loss provisions over equity book value 
BETA Systemic risk 
ROAE Net results from ordinary activity over total average equity 
ROAA Net results from ordinary activity over total average asset 
SHROA 
Annual ROA over its standard deviation calculated over the entire sample 
period  
Z-SCORE 
i
ti,
ti,
ti,
ti,
σROA
TA
E
ROA
scoreZ









  
COST-
INCOME 
Total operating expenses over intermediation margin 
TA Total asset (euro mln) 
 
  
21 
 
Table 2  Summary statistics for all banks in the sample, on average over the period 2006-
2015  
 
 
 
Obs mean min p25 p50 p75 max sd 
         
Performance Measure 
PBV 424 1.06 0.19 0.56 0.86 1.36 3.57 0.65 
ROAA 424 0.35 -1.94 0.14 0.39 0.64 2.11 0.57 
SHROA 423 1.22 -2.15 0.33 1.07 2.09 5.21 1.41 
Z-SCORE 424 17.53 1.25 10.59 15.05 23.92 49.35 9.35 
         
Business Mix 
INT/BV 424 0.271 0.089 0.205 0.253 0.325 0.761 0.095 
ADJ_INT/BV 423 0.328 0.111 0.242 0.303 0.386 0.929 0.125 
NON/BV 424 0.163 -0.118 0.098 0.144 0.193 0.612 0.102 
COMM/BV 427 0.120 0.000 0.078 0.109 0.151 0.332 0.062 
BANK/BV 423 0.040 -0.245 0.010 0.033 0.058 0.356 0.066 
MKT/BV 423 0.064 -0.001 0.033 0.052 0.082 0.287 0.054 
TRAD/BV 427 0.056 0.000 0.031 0.046 0.072 0.210 0.043 
         
Business Mix composition 
INT/TOP 423 63.9% 15.7% 57.6% 66.3% 72.8% 107.7% 14.8% 
COMM/TOP 427 27.2% 0.0% 21.2% 26.8% 31.4% 67.4% 10.6% 
TRAD/TOP 424 8.4% -130.0% 2.5% 8.2% 14.4% 50.7% 15.8% 
ADJ_INT/TOP 423 76.9% 23.8% 69.4% 78.6% 87.6% 157.6% 18.0% 
MKT/TOP 424 77.3% -137.1% 62.9% 76.8% 89.4% 509.9% 41.6% 
COMM/NON 424 22.7% -409.9% 10.6% 23.2% 37.1% 237.1% 41.6% 
TRAD/NON 415 47.7% 0.0% 31.5% 44.3% 64.4% 101.8% 26.0% 
BANK/COMM 416 52.2% -2.2% 35.6% 55.7% 68.4% 100.0% 26.1% 
MKT/COMM 423 63.9% 15.7% 57.6% 66.3% 72.8% 107.7% 14.8% 
 
Efficiency and risk 
COST/BV 424 0.295 0.100 0.221 0.273 0.339 1.009 0.114 
LLP/BV 424 0.085 -0.018 0.029 0.065 0.112 0.719 0.090 
BETA 431 1.329 0.033 0.965 1.301 1.659 2.791 0.522 
COST_INCOME 424 0.629 0.358 0.534 0.616 0.688 1.622 0.147 
TA [billion] 432 557 22 121 267 843 2,590 593 
For a definition of the variables, see Table 1.  
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Table 3  Market performance and business mix 
This table reports the results of a panel data random effect. Regression coefficients are reported with standard error 
in parenthesis. The dependent variable is year end PBV for year “t”. INT measures net interest margin over equity 
book value. ADJ_INT is the ratio of net interest margin plus banking commission over equity book value. NON 
is the ratio of non-interest income [COMM+TRAD] over equity book value, COMM is the sum of banking and 
market commission over equity book value. BANK, MKT and TRAD measure respectively, the ratio of banking 
commission, of market commission and of the trading profit over equity book value. The following bank efficiency 
and risk variables are included in the regression: COST is the ratio between personnel and other administrative 
expenses over equity book value, LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to equity book value, BETA is a measure 
of systemic risk. Two time dummy variables are included in the analysis: CRISIS_FIN equals to one for the years 
2008 and 2009 and equals to zero otherwise; CRISIS_GOV equals to one for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 and 
equals to zero otherwise. Two country dummy variables are included in the analysis: EURO_CORE equals to one 
for France, Germany, Ireland, Belgium and Austria and equals to zero otherwise; EURO_NON_CORE equals to 
one for Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
For a definition of the variables, see Table 1. The observation period is 2006–2015.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 3 Mod. 4 Mod. 5 Mod. 6 
       
Constant 1.210*** 1.225*** 1.189*** 1.154*** 0.969*** 1.111*** 
 (0.134) (0.143) (0.139) (0.141) (0.134) (0.151) 
INT 0.572 0.554 0.728    
 (0.489) (0.503) (0.544)    
ADJ_INT    1.135*** 1.498*** 1.605*** 
    (0.432) (0.413) (0.410) 
NON 1.842***      
 (0.345)      
COMM  3.063***     
  (0.778)     
BANK   1.610    
   (1.119)    
MKT   3.661*** 3.702*** 3.338*** 2.954*** 
   (1.033) (1.027) (0.976) (0.962) 
TRAD  1.835*** 1.769*** 1.953*** 1.347*** 1.303*** 
  (0.450) (0.450) (0.444) (0.420) (0.422) 
COST -0.124 -0.698 -0.662 -0.796 -0.637 -0.591 
 (0.500) (0.584) (0.584) (0.604) (0.567) (0.570) 
LLP -1.749*** -1.725*** -1.599*** -1.593*** -1.325*** -1.285*** 
 (0.360) (0.369) (0.380) (0.382) (0.358) (0.363) 
BETA -0.317*** -0.312*** -0.301*** -0.315*** -0.127** -0.124** 
 (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) 
CRISIS_FIN     -0.364*** -0.377*** 
     (0.066) (0.066) 
CRISIS_GOV     -0.426*** -0.436*** 
     (0.057) (0.058) 
EURO_CORE      -0.277* 
      (0.142) 
EURO_NON_CORE      -0.214* 
      (0.137) 
       
Observations 401 395 388 389 389 389 
Number of ID 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Adj. R2 0.2315 0.2434 0.2428 0.2553 0.3714 0.3669 
                    ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table 4  Pseudo-F ( Calinski-Harabasz) 
Number of 
clusters 
Pseudo-F ( 
Calinski-Harabasz) 
Number of 
clusters 
Pseudo-F ( 
Calinski-Harabasz) 
2 19.99 9 18.32 
3 22.30 10 17.83 
4 21.26 11 17.72 
5 21.62 12 17.66 
6 20.97 13 17.71 
7 20.56 14 17.41 
8 19.20 15 17.08 
The Calinski and Harabasz (1974) pseudo-F index is an estimate of the between-cluster variance divided by within-
cluster variance 
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Table 5  The performance of identified clusters  
This table reports the results descriptive statistics for the cluster identified. We use Ward’s cluster analysis 
technique. Market Weight represents the weight of the different business mixes over total revenues (ADJ_INT, 
MKT, TRAD) evaluated at market value. Accounting Weight represents the weight of the different business mixes 
over total revenues (ADJ_INT, MKT, TRAD) as determined by accounting measure. ADJ_INT is the ratio of net 
interest margin plus banking commission over total revenue. MKT is the ratio of market commission over total 
revenue, TRAD is the ratio of trading over total revenue. INT  is the ratio of net interest income over total revenue. 
BANK is the ratio of banking commission over total revenue. COST is the ratio between personnel and other 
administrative expenses over equity book value, LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to tangible book value, 
INTERNATIONALIZATION is the bank's internationalization index, BETA is a measure of systemic risk, ROAE 
is the return on average equity, ROAA is the return on average asset, SHROAA is the risk adjusted return on 
average asset, Z-score is the measure of bank insolvency risk in terms of distance to default, COST-INCOME is 
the ratio between total operating expenses over intermediation margin, TA is the total asset in billions of euros. 
All the variable are expressed in terms of mean value for each bank over the ten year time span.  
For a definition of the variables, see Table 1. The observation period is 2006–2015.  
 
  Cluster Cluster Cluster 
 1 3 4 
Business Model Retail  
Retail 
Diversified 
Market based 
    
Number of banks 16 21 8 
Business Mix    
Market Weight ADJ_INT 83.7%* 67.9%* 41.4%* 
Market Weight MKT 10.4%* 26.2%* 47.6%* 
Market Weight TRAD 5.9%* 5.9%* 10.9%* 
Accounting Weight ADJ_INT 85.5%* 76.6%* 52.0%* 
Accounting Weight INT 68.2%* 66.7%* 42.5%* 
Accounting Weight BANK 17.2%* 9.8%* 9.4%* 
Accounting Weight MKT 5.2%* 15.7%* 34.4%* 
Accounting Weight TRAD 9.4%* 7.8%* 13.7%* 
Efficiency and risk    
COST 29.4%* 26.8%* 36.6%* 
LLP 12.2%* 8.0%* 2.6%* 
INTERNATIONALIZATION -4.3%* 3.2% 4.1%* 
BETA 1.25 1.39 1.33 
Performance measures    
ROAE 5.66% 6.18% 7.12% 
ROAA 0.39% 0.34% 0.31% 
SHROAA 1.04* 1.29* 1.43* 
Zscore 16.13* 17.57 20.84 
COST-INCOME 62.0%* 60.9%* 79.0%* 
TA (euro billion) 428* 600* 723* 
        
* statistically significant differences at the 5% level based on pair-wise t-test comparisons  
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Figure 1  Radar Plot – Distribution of weights among the clusters (mean value) 
This figure reports the radar plot for the cluster identified using Ward’s cluster analysis technique. Market Weights 
(MKT_WEIGHT) represents the weight of the different business mixes over total revenues (ADJ_INT, MKT, 
TRAD) evaluated at market value. Accounting Weights (ACC_WEIGHTS) represents the weight of the different 
business mixes over total revenues (ADJ_INT, MKT, TRAD) as determined by accounting measure.  
ADJ_INT is the ratio of net interest margin plus banking commission over total revenue. MKT is the ratio of 
market commission over total revenue, TRAD is the ratio of trading over total revenue. 
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Table 6  Different market performance measures: Robustness check 
 
This table reports the results of a panel data random effect. Regression coefficients are reported with standard error 
in parenthesis. The dependent variables are year end PBV for year t (1); PBV computed at the end of January t+1 
(2); PBV computed at the end of February t+1 (3); PBV computed at the end of March t+1 (4); PBV computed at 
the end of April t+1 (5); PBV computed at the end of May t+1 (6). ADJ_INT is the ratio of net interest margin 
plus banking commission over equity book value. MKT and TRAD measure respectively, the ratio of market 
commission and the trading profit over equity book value. The following bank efficiency and risk variables are 
included in the regression: COST is the ratio between personnel and other administrative expenses over equity 
book value, LLP is the ratio of loan loss provisions to tangible book value, BETA is a measure of systemic risk. 
Two time dummy variables are included in the analysis: CRISIS_FIN equals to one for the years 2008 and 2009 
and equals to zero otherwise; CRISIS_GOV equals to one for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 and equals to zero 
otherwise. Two country dummy variables are included in the analysis: EURO_CORE equals to one for France, 
Germany, Ireland, Belgium and Austria and equals to zero otherwise; EURO_NON_CORE equals to one for 
Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
For a definition of the variables, see Table 1. The observation period is 2006–2015. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 PBV_YEAR_END PBV_JAN PBV_FEB PBV_MARCH PBV_APRIL PBV_MAY 
       
Constant 1.111*** 1.004*** 0.930*** 0.899*** 1.091*** 1.089*** 
 (0.151) (0.153) (0.142) (0.145) (0.151) (0.152) 
ADJ_INT 1.605*** 1.045** 1.534*** 1.483*** 1.047** 1.096*** 
 (0.410) (0.418) (0.391) (0.399) (0.412) (0.419) 
MKT 2.954*** 1.550* 1.235* 1.284* 2.070** 1.463* 
 (0.962) (0.964) (0.886) (0.906) (0.959) (0.968) 
TRAD 1.303*** 1.207*** 1.385*** 1.392*** 1.367*** 1.090** 
 (0.422) (0.441) (0.409) (0.415) (0.434) (0.448) 
COST -0.591 -0.354 -0.130 -0.243 -0.145 -0.077 
 (0.570) (0.562) (0.518) (0.529) (0.564) (0.571) 
LLP -1.285*** -0.921*** -1.658*** -1.573*** -0.590* -0.750** 
 (0.363) (0.353) (0.354) (0.359) (0.350) (0.359) 
BETA -0.124** -0.098* -0.042 -0.026 -0.077 -0.096 
 (0.060) (0.062) (0.057) (0.058) (0.061) (0.062) 
CRISIS_FIN -0.377*** -0.455*** -0.522*** -0.458*** -0.420*** -0.448*** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.064) (0.065) (0.068) (0.070) 
CRISIS_GOV -0.436*** -0.300*** -0.323*** -0.391*** -0.381*** -0.392*** 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.055) (0.056) (0.059) (0.061) 
EURO_CORE -0.277* -0.264* -0.321** -0.325** -0.228* -0.238* 
 (0.142) (0.140) (0.128) (0.132) (0.138) (0.135) 
EURO_NON_CORE -0.214* -0.221* -0.217* -0.210* -0.251* -0.259** 
 (0.137) (0.136) (0.124) (0.128) (0.133) (0.130) 
       
Observations 389 392 391 390 392 390 
Numb. of ID 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Adj. R2 0.3669 0.2777 0.3382 0.3322 0.2851 0.2783 
                ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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Table A.1  List of European listed banks 
Country     Bank Name Average TA [000,000] 
AT Erste Group Bank AG 202,493 
AT Raiffeisen Bank International AG 125,671 
BE KBC Groep NV/ KBC Groupe SA-KBC Group 248,286 
CH Credit Suisse Group AG 750,358 
CH Julius Baer Group Ltd 62,668 
CH UBS Group AG 905,762 
DE Aareal Bank AG 47,559 
DE Commerzbank AG 569,159 
DE Deutsche Bank AG 1,742,877 
DE Deutsche Postbank AG 163,863 
DK Danske Bank A/S 451,624 
DK Jyske Bank A/S (Group) 53,912 
ES Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 650,626 
ES Banco de Sabadell SA 174,261 
ES Banco Popular Espanol SA 156,109 
ES Banco Santander SA 1,247,980 
ES Bankia, SA 258,653 
ES Bankinter SA 57,329 
ES Caixabank, S.A. 342,843 
FR BNP Paribas SA 1,947,418 
FR Crédit Agricole S.A. 1,563,645 
FR Crédit Industriel et Commercial SA - CIC 242,077 
FR Natixis SA 532,306 
FR Société Générale SA 1,276,903 
IE Allied Irish Banks plc 112,703 
IT Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA-Gruppo MPS 192,612 
IT Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna 61,328 
IT Banca Popolare di Milano SCaRL 50,076 
IT Banco Popolare - Società Cooperativa-Banco Popolare 125,389 
IT Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 655,697 
IT Mediobanca SpA - Banca di Credito Finanziario SpA 73,174 
IT UniCredit SpA 869,329 
IT Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa-UBI Banca 123,916 
NL ING Groep NV 1,020,533 
PL Powszechna Kasa Oszczednosci Bank Polski SA - PKO BP SA 54,113 
PT Banco Comercial Português, SA-Millennium bcp 80,749 
SE Nordea Bank AB (publ) 653,706 
SE Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB 279,792 
SE Svenska Handelsbanken 283,145 
SE Swedbank AB 220,194 
UK Barclays Plc 1,663,703 
UK HSBC Holdings Plc 2,090,164 
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UK Lloyds Banking Group Plc 1,080,090 
UK Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (The) 1,314,515 
UK Standard Chartered Plc 538,401 
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